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Vertical intra-industry trade  
between EU and Accession Countries 
Abstract 
The paper analyses vertical intra-industry trade between EU and Accession countries, 
and concentrates on two country-specific determinants: Differences in personal income 
distribution and in technology. Both determinants have a strong link to national policies 
and to cross-border investment flows. In contrast to most other studies, income distribu-
tion is not seen as time-invariant variable, but as changing over time. What is new is 
also that differences in technology are tested in comparison with cost advantages from 
capital/labour ratios. The study applies panel estimation techniques with GLS. Results 
show country-pair fixed effects to be of high relevance for explaining vertical intra-
industry trade. In addition, bilateral differences in personal income distribution and their 
changes are positive related to vertical intra-industry trade in this special regional inte-
gration framework; hence, distributional effects of policies matter. Also, technology dif-
ferences turn out to be positively correlated with vertical intra-industry trade. However, 
the cost variable (here: relative GDP per capita) shows no clear picture, particularly not 
in combination with the technology variable. 
JEL: F14, F15 
Keywords: Intra-industry trade, transition countries. 
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Vertikaler intra-industrieller Handel  
zwischen der EU und den Beitrittsländern 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Studie konzentriert sich auf zwei länderspezifische Bestimmungsgrößen des ver-
tikalen intra-industriellen Handels, die auch für den Handel zwischen der EU und den 
Beitrittsländern von Relevanz sein könnten: Unterschiede in der personellen Einkom-
mensverteilung und in der verwendeten Technologie. Beide Determinanten weisen eine 
Verbindung  zu  nationalen  Politiken  und  zu  grenzüberschreitenden  Investitionen  auf. 
Anders als in den meisten Studien wird die Einkommensverteilung nicht als zeitinvari-
ante Konstante, sondern als sich über die Zeit hinweg ändernde Variable gesehen. Neu 
ist ebenfalls, daß Unterschiede in den angewendeten Produktionstechnologien im Ver-
gleich mit Kostenvorteilen getestet werden, die ihrerseits auf die Faktorausstattung (Ka-
pital-Arbeit) zurückgehen. Die Studie verwendet Panel-Techniken mit GLS. Ihre Ergeb-
nisse zeigen, dass länderpaarspezifische feste Effekte von hoher Relevanz für die Erklä-
rung vertikaler Strukturen im intra-industriellen Handel sind. Gleichfalls sind bilaterale 
Differenzen in der Einkommensverteilung und ihre Veränderungen positiv mit vertika-
lem intra-industriellen Handel im vorliegenden regionalen Integrationsrahmen korreliert 
sind. Das heißt, die Verteilungseffekte der Politik spielen ebenfalls eine Rolle. Etwas 
Ähnliches gilt für die Bestimmungsgröße „Technologie“. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigt die 
Kostenvariable keine klaren Ergebnisse, vor allem dann nicht, wenn sie in Kombination 
mit der Technologievariable getestet wird. 
 
Schlagworte:  
internationaler  Handel,  intra-industrielle  Handel,  vertikaler  intra-industrieller  Handel, 
Europäische Union, Einkommensverteilung, Technologie, Panel-Analysen  
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Vertical intra-industry trade  
between EU and Accession Countries 
1  Introduction 
There is a broad and still expanding library on vertical intra-industry trade around mod-
els, measurement problems and application to countries. This paper belongs to the latter 
strand of literature. What it is concerned with is to ask why product differentiation in 
trade of EU with 10 accession countries (ACs) is dominantly between high and low 
quality varieties of the same goods (‘vertical’). Although this study does not explicitly 
discuss policy issues, its results may implicitly add to political considerations. For ex-
ample, intra-industry trade is commonly related to the ‘smooth labour market adjust-
ment hypothesis’, which states that workers of a given industry may easier find a job in 
another company of the same industry when international competition is within and not 
between industries. However, vertical intra-industry trade challenges this hypothesis, for 
technologies in producing similar goods are different, and skills may not suffice to find 
a job in another firm producing a similar good with different technology. A second ex-
ample is personal income distribution. In intra-industry trade models, inequality in per-
sonal income distribution is disregarded, but in vertical trade models, income distribu-
tion plays a leading role as explanatory argument, and policy with its distributional ef-
fects comes into the play. 
The trade relations between the two groups of countries – the ACs being former socialist 
countries – are characterised by a fast track of regional integration and short distances 
(compared  to  other  empirical  studies).  However,  they  drew relatively  little  attention 
among trade economists (Gabrisch and Segnana 2002 and 2003 on European transition 
countries, and Zhang et al. 2005, for China are the exceptions). Industry-specific ap-
proaches (Djankov and Hoekman 1996, Thorn and McDowell 1998, Aturupane et al. 
1999) seem to dominate among the few studies on transition countries. However, indus-
try-specific approaches root rather in the industrial economics, that is a set of theories 
explaining product differentiation behaviour of firms (for example, Shaked and Sutton, 
1987), and not in trade economics. The present paper is from the perspective of trade 
economics, in which country-specific determinants matter. Here, two sets of variables 
are of specific interest: The first one captures differences in income distribution. Con-
trary to other empirical research, the paper does not treat income distribution as a time-
invariant variable. Rather the change of differences between countries is considered, not 
at least, since ACs experienced major changes in income distribution towards more ine-
quality (and back) during their transition from a socialist to a market economy. The sec-
ond set of variables includes relative factor endowment and/or differences in technol- 
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ogy.  Factor  endowment  and/or  technology  differences  between  EU  and  AC  became 
visible after opening the economy and imposing free trade agreements in bilateral trade. 
Different to other research we try clearly to distinguish between cost and quality deter-
minants, and aim to solve the long-lasting problem whether GDP per capita stands for 
technology or factor endowment differences.  
The remainder of the study includes four sections: Section 2 describes the position of 
income distribution and technology and capital/labour ratios in the theory and empirics 
of intra-industry trade, and discusses the results of empirical studies. In section 3, it fol-
lows a presentation of the dependent and independent variables for estimations with the 
relevant stylized facts. Section 4 presents the empirical part of the study including the 
strategy for and the results of estimations. Section 5 provides conclusions and some pol-
icy-oriented hypotheses for further research.   
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2  Income distribution, cost and technology advantages  
in the theory and empirics of intra-industry trade  
Income distribution within each country and differences in technology do not matter in 
first-generation models of intra-industry trade (see above all Helpman 1987, and Hum-
mels’ and Levinson’s empirical study from 1995). The intra-industry shares in bilateral 
trade increase with rising similarity of countries in size and declines with rising differ-
ences in capital/labour ratios. The latter explain the inter-industry trade component in 
total trade. The models assume households in two countries to consume all varieties of 
the  differentiated  good  of  the  same  quality.  In  empirical  research,  GDP  differences 
proxy the similarity in size. Similarity in size stands for similar consumer tastes and 
serves as argument for horizontal trade patterns. The GDP per capita (or worker) stands 
for different capital/labour ratios. A capital abundant country is thought to pay higher 
wages than a labour abundant country. While empirical estimations confirmed the posi-
tive impact of size similarity on intra-industry trade shares, Hummels and Levinsohn re-
vealed a negative sign of the relative GDP per capita in pooled OLS estimations only (as 
predicted). When panel estimations with fixed effects were used in order to ‘clear’ the 
error term from truly idiosyncratic errors, the sign turned positive. Authors explained 
this change with country-pair specific effects like distance and land to labour ratios, 
which are beyond the theory on intra-industry trade. Durkin and Krygier (2000) chal-
lenged this conclusion, pointing at the possibility that intra-industry trade is not over-
whelmingly horizontal but vertical and thus, the GDP per capita variable can obtain a 
positive sign in line with a theory that explains vertical intra-industry trade.  
In contrast to first-generation models, vertical intra-industry trade models necessarily as-
sume that each household consumes only one variety of the good, which is differentiated 
according to quality. Therefore, income distribution within a country matters with re-
spect to the combination of varieties consumed by a nation. With rising differences in 
income distribution, the models predict a rising share of the vertical intra-industry share. 
Empirical research usually confirmed this relationship, so that in some approaches the 
variable is simply disregarded (Diaz Mora, 2002). Rather, empirical research focuses on 
production side structures, since the household side is not sufficient to explain, which of 
the varieties is produced in each of the trading countries. Borrowing from the traditional 
trade  theory,  vertical  intra-industry  trade  models  split  into  neo-Heckscher-Ohlin  and 
neo-Ricardian approaches. In empirical neo-HO models, the GDP per capita stands for 
capital/labour ratio but, in contrast to first-generation theory, a positive correlation to in-
tra-industry trade is predicted. However, when total trade includes vertical intra-industry 
trade  and  inter-industry  trade,  factor  proportions  cannot  explain  both.  Falvey  and 
Kierzkovski (1987) solved the problem at the theoretical level. In their model, inter-
industry trade occurs by the exchange of the homogeneous against the differentiated 
good. The homogeneous good is produced with one single input factor and a techno-
logical advantage of one of the trading countries in its labour input function. The differ- 
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entiated good is produced according to capital/labour ratios. Consequently, technology 
is negatively and capital/labour ratios are positively correlated with vertical trade, and 
vice versa with inter-industry trade. Most recent empirical studies try to test the rele-
vance of a HO framework with factor endowment differences among countries (see, for 
example, Díaz Mora, 2002, Montaner and Orts Ríos, 2002) and find evidence for this 
approach.  
A plausibility problem with the neo-HO approach is that the relative price of each vari-
ety of the differentiated good is driven by relative costs. Hence, quality differences re-
flect  cost  differences,  an  assumption,  which  hardly  seems  to  have  ‘the  right  feel’ 
(Krugman 1986, p. 37). Simply said, if one wants to have both vertical intra-industry 
trade and HO, one might be forced to make appropriate but implausible assumptions. 
The  neo-Ricardian  model  of  vertical  intra-industry  trade,  which  Flam  and  Helpman 
(1987) developed, might be a good candidate to solve this gap. With one factor input 
(labour) only, differences in technology explain one country’s advantage in producing a 
higher quality of the differentiated good. With monopolistic competition, quality differ-
ences are reflected in price and wage differences. In this model, there is no room for fac-
tor endowment differences. An improvement in technology in the home country im-
proves the advantage of this country in producing the high quality variety and raises the 
price of that variety, and the wage rate in producing it. A change in the relative price of 
the differentiated good sets incentives for the reallocation of production: more labour 
will be used for the-high quality variety in the home country and for low-quality variety 
in the foreign country. The Flam-Helpman model creates the room for a ‘product-quality 
cycle in trade relations, which the Falvey-Kierzkowski model does not offer. This cycle 
opens the option that firms in the technologically advanced country s concentrate on the 
high-quality varieties after the technological innovation occurred, and shift production 
of the varieties with outdated technology to the backward country. To put it differently: 
upgrading in terms of technology is possible, but not catching-up, and this might shed 
new light on the foreign direct investment story. This perspective is not contained in the 
Falvey-Kierzkowski model, for technology matters in producing the homogeneous good. 
Durkin and Krygier (2000) tested the Flam-Helpman model for US trade with other 
OECD countries, however treating the GDP per capita variable as expression for tech-
nology differences. They found the expected positive correlations between the GDP per 
capita and vertical intra-industry trade. But it remains unclear what their test really re-
vealed: the positive correlation between the GDP per capita and vertical intra-industry 
shares might stand for a HO interpretation, but also for a Ricardian framework. It seems 
necessary to insert an independent technology variable into econometric specifications 
in order to control explicitly for the character of cost and technology advantages.   
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3  Variables and stylized facts 
3.1  Dependent variables 
Intra-industry trade shares in total trade are calculated applying the Grubel-Lloyd index 
on 778 industries (4-digit level) of chapters 3 throughout 8 (manufacturing industries) of 
the Combined Nomenclature from Eurostat (for more details and problems see Annex 
I). We disentangle the both components, vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade, by 
following the usual calculation (Abd-el-Rahman 1984) and use unit values in exports 
and imports. Following the literature, we split vertical intra-industry indices into high-
quality  and  low-quality  components.  From  the  theoretical  perspective  such  a  de-
composition is not necessary, for vertical and high-quality vertical intra-industry trade 
models include the same set of (factor endowment) variables. We only report results.  
We calculated country-pair indices for a matrix with m = 14 EU countries (excluding 
Luxembourg), and n = 10 Accession countries, and received 140 observations per year. 
Since data on income distribution is the limiting factor in comparative research and al-
lows for only three years observations in this study, we calculated the trade variable for 
the years 1993,1 2000 and 2004. We start with 1993, when East European countries 
were still in an early stage of systemic transition. In this year, European agreements 
started to gradually impose a free trade zone between the EU and transition countries, 
which should end with their accession to the Union and the customs union. In May 
2004, 8 of the 10 countries became members of the EU in with Bulgaria and Romania 
being the exceptions.  
Figure 1 illustrate the descriptive statistics for (140x3 = 140) country-pair indices of to-
tal intra-industry trade. With trade liberalised step by step since 1993, the mean bilateral 
intra-industry share in total trade between EU and ACs rose from mere 13% on average 
to 21% in 2004. Nevertheless, yet trade between both regions is overwhelmingly inter-
industry.  The high standard deviations report strong differences. For example, intra-
industry trade shares were between 67% (Germany-Czech Republic) and 1% for (Portu-
gal-Latvia)  in  2004.  But  intra-industry  trade  is  vertically  dominated  (Figure  2).  The 
mean  values  are  fairly  above  80%  of  intra-industry  trade,  although  they  decreased 
somewhat between 1993 and 2004.   
                                                 
1  Data for Austria, Finland and Sweden are for 1995.   
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Figure 1: 
GL-indices of total and vertical intra-industry trade in EU trade flows with Accession 

















Source: Eurostat Online database (2005a); author’s calculations  
Figure 2: 


















Source: Eurostat Online database (2005a); author’s calculation 
Figure 3 presents the EU’s high-quality position in vertical trade with ACs. In general, 
we observe an erosion of the quality position of the EU. Nevertheless, most country-
pairs include a quality advantage of the EU country. The lowest quality advantage for a 
EU country was (in 2004) in Finnish-Czech trade flows.    
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Figure 3: 
Shares of EU high-quality position in total vertical intra-industry trade with ACs 1993, 
























Source: Eurostat Online database (2005a); author’s calculations. 
3.2  Explanatory variables 
(a) Personal income distribution 
Inequality in income distribution is treated as a time-invariant country-pair specific ef-
fect in most research (Durkin and Krygier, 2000, Montaner and Orts Ríos, 2002, but not 
Zhang et al, 2005). The argument is that income distribution tends to remain stable over 
time. In a larger time horizon, this treatment is not plausible at least for European transi-
tion countries, where inequality increased quickly in the first stage of their transition 
(Milanovic 1998, Aghion and Commander 1999). This study uses personal income dis-
tribution, for it captures not only changes in the relation of market wages and market 
profits, but also redistribution from, tax policy and changes in the social system. Data is 
from UNU/WIDER on World Income Inequality Database (WIID2a 2005)), however, 
data do not fit precisely with the years used for trade indices. The country-pair observa-
tions of (changes of) differences in income inequality are calculated according to the 
overlap concept, which Flam and Helpman (1987) directly derived from theory. The 
concept assumes a dividing income class in each national economy (for detailed infor-
mation see Annex II). Figure 4 presents the descriptive statistics of country-pair specific 
differences in income distribution for three years of observations since 1987. The high-
est value for the third observation (“2004”) was the difference in income inequality be-
tween Denmark and Poland, the lowest value between France and Hungary. Values may 
fall into the range between 0 and 100. A value of 0 means no income distribution; the 
higher the value, the more relative inequality has a positive impact on vertical intra-
industry trade. The first impression from Figure 4 is a declining difference in country-
pair  income  distribution  between  EU  and  Accession  countries.  This  general  decline 
seems to reflect the reaction of policy to the increasing poverty ratios among population  
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in transition countries. It seems to be in line with declining vertical shares in bilateral 
trade. 
Figure 4: 



















Sources: author’s calculations; UNU/WIDER (2005),(WIID2a). 
(b) Technology and factor endowment  
When transition started, AC lagged behind in terms of technology. Since then, import of 
capital and capital goods contributed to a remarkable upgrading of technology. This 
study uses data on the number of firms applying leading technology and of firms with 
low technology for each country (Eurostat Online Database 2006). We decided for this 
indicator in order to obtain a picture, which is independent from any value calculations 
like cost variables.2 Again, we have no precise fit of years with the other variables; we 
can calculate ratios for three years, which we assign to 1993, 2000, and 2004. We calcu-
lated the ratios of leading to low technology firms for each country and took the abso-
lute difference between two countries. The indicator can take values between 0 and 1. 
The higher the value is, the larger is the technology difference. Figure 5 provides the de-
scriptive statistics for country-pair ratios. In the third year of observation (“2004”), the 
largest bilateral difference was between Germany-Romania, and the lowest difference 
between Denmark-Poland. Mean values suggest a fall in technology differences, and the 
standard deviation reports some convergence among country-pairs. 
                                                 
2   An often used proxy for technology is based on R&D expenditures (Coe and Helpman 1995, Monta-
ner and Orts Rios, 2002), presented, for example by the OECD (Basic Science and Technology Sta-
tistics). However, to obtain the R&D capital stock, a calculation procedures with some critical as-
sumptions (about depreciation ratios, for example) is required.  
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Figure 5: 






















Source: Eurostat Online database, (2006); author’s calculations. 
The relative GDP per capita may serve either as proxy for technology differences (Ri-
cardian model) with a negative sign or for relative factor endowment (HO model) with a 
positive sign if combined with the independent technology variable. Data in Euro (Ecu) 
are taken from Eurostat Online; Figure 6 illustrates relative GDP per capita in exchange 
rates, measured as the mean value of 140 bilateral differences. The mean difference in 
GDP per capita between EU and ACs increased between 1993 and 2004. For example, 
the highest bilateral difference was Ireland-Bulgaria with 24.100 Euro in 2004, after 
8.700 Euro in 1993 and 20.100 in 2000. The stylized facts suggest expecting a high (and 
even increasing) share of vertical trade pattern.  
Figure 6: 

















Sources: Eurostat Online Database (2005b); author’s calculations.  
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4.  Empirical strategy and estimation results 
4.1  Empirical strategy 
We test a vertical intra-industry trade model directly and indirectly, and apply OLS and 
GLS specifications with pooled and panel data sets. Equation (1) presents the vertical 
model in the basic pooled version:  
VIITjk,t = b0 + b1REL-GDPCjk,t + b2REL-TECHjk,t + b3REL-INDISjk,t +  
b4MINSIZEk,t + b5MAXSIZEk,t + b6DISTANCEjk,t + b7 CUDUMjk,t + m jk,t  (1) 
where VIITjk,t is the vertical intra-industry index in trade of the reporting EU country j 
with its partner country k at time t. Since indices are between [0,1], we use logistic 
transformations for VIIT, while explanatory variables are in logarithmic expressions. 
Indirect tests serve to check the behaviour of coefficients, when total and horizontal in-
tra-industry trade (TIIT and HIIT) replace for VIIT in equation (1). m is the error term. 
The next explanatory variable measures the difference in the GDP per capita between 
both countries (GDPCCj,t – GDPCk,t).3 In first generation models of intra-industry trade, 
the variable explains (with a negative sign) the inter-industry trade component of total 
trade. In a world of vertical dominated trade, this variable can have a positive sign (ex-
plaining  technology  differences)  or  a  negative  sign  (explaining  differences  in  capi-
tal/labour ratios). Hence, a meaningful interpretation is possible only in the context with 
the sign the technology variable REL-TECH obtains in regressions. A positive sign of 
the latter and a negative sign or insignificance of REL-GDPC is a hint for technology 
differences, which determine vertical trade. On the other side, a positive sign of REL-
GDP in combination with a negative sign (or insignificance) of the technology variable 
seems to confirm the neo-Heckscher-Ohlin perspective, where capital/labour ratios rule 
quality differences.  
REL-INDIS stands for differences in income distribution, and the coefficient should be 
positive in explaining vertical intra-industry trade, and negative or insignificant in TIIT 
(and HIIT) specifications.  
The MIN and MAX variables proxy size differences in terms of total GDP, and they 
stand  for  the  similarity  of  consumer  tastes  and  the  power  of  HIIT.  MINSIZEj 
(MAXSIZE)  selects  the  lower  (larger)  GDP  from  a  pair  of  countries.  The  first-
generation theory of intra-industry trade predicts a positive (negative) sign for MINSIZE 
                                                 
3   The GDP per capita of EU countries is higher than in AC tn all bilateral cases; hence, we do not need 
to calculate absolute differences like usually in other research.  
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(MAXSIZE), since size stands for similarity and common consumer tastes.4 Vertical in-
tra-industry trade theory does not clearly predict the signs for size variables. Durkin and 
Krygier found the opposite behaviour of the variables in TIIT, VIIT and HIIT estima-
tions. While similarity in size explains the increase of TIIT in total trade and of HIIT in 
total intra-industry trade, it might be insignificant or even negatively correlated with 
VIIT.  
DISTANCE is a proxy for transactions costs of trade, which increase with a larger geo-
graphical distance. It brings the model closer to gravity models of trade. The variable is 
measured in kilometres between the capitals of both countries. The expected sign is 
negative in all specifications, for the relevance of transaction costs in trade with differ-
entiated goods is higher compared to inter-industry trade with homogeneous goods. All 
specifications include a liberalisation dummy, which captures the membership of an ac-
cession country in the EU customs union (CUDUM). If an AC is a member of the union, 
the dummy receives the value 1 (which applies to 8 of 10 countries for 2004 with Bul-
garia and Romania being the exceptions). In all other cases, the dummy receives the 
value 0. The predicted sign is positive for all specifications. To summarize, Table 1 pro-
vides an overview on signs of variables predicted thy theory:  
Table 1: 
Predicted signs of coefficients 
  REL-GDPC  MAXSIZE  MINSIZE  DISTANCE  REL-TECH  REL-INDIS  CUDUM 
VIIT  > 0 (HO) 
< 0 (Ric.)  > 0 (?)  < 0 (?)  < 0  < 0 (HO) 
> 0 (Ric.)  > 0  > 0 
TIIT  < 0  < 0  > 0  < 0  < 0  < 0  > 0 
HIIT  < 0  < 0 (?)  > 0 (?)  < 0  < 0  < 0  > 0 
TIIT = Total IIT, VIIT = Vertical IIT, HIIT = Horizontal IIT. HO = Heckscher-Ohlin (relative factor endowment); 
Ric. = Ricardian (technology differences). 
Complementary to regressions with pooled data we apply panel techniques with fixed 
effects (FE) specification. The time span (1993 throughout 2004) seems wide enough to 
run  models.  Pooled  regressions  produce  a  common  constant  for  all  country-pairs. It 
seems to be the appropriate specifications, since bilateral trade agreements between EU 
and AC are identical, for trade policy is a matter of the EU authorities and not of single 
member countries. However, one cannot exclude that apart from general trade rules of 
the EU, bilateral trade relations are ruled by other specifics, including non-economical 
                                                 
4  Assume GDPj/GDPk to be ratio illustrating similarity of the size of both countries j and k, and the ra-
tio < 1. Then, we can write as empirical function IIT = alnGDPj + blnGDPk, and we expect for b a 
negative sign. Since Loertscher and Wolter (1980, p. 283) most empirical studies, including 
that of Helpman (1987) used this empirical specification of the size-similarity variables.   
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ones.  For  example,  border  trade  regimes  (Germany-Poland,  Austria-Hungary,  Italy-
Slovenia) might exert a certain impact on bilateral trade compared to other country pairs 
(France-Poland,  Belgium-Slovenia).  Further,  different  regimes  of  factor  movement 
(capital, labour) might affect bilateral trade. Finally, in pooled regressions, the error 
term might include time-invariant effects beyond the distance variable. FE models try to 
capture  cultural  differences  between  country  pairs.  Indeed,  the  friendly  relations  be-
tween Austria and Hungary in their common history (until 1918) might influence trade 
patterns – a factor that certainly has no effect in Ireland-Hungary relations. We apply the 
likelihood ratio test in order to find out the superiority of a fixed effects model specifi-
cation over a model with pooled data. Since the error term might be correlated with in-
dependent variables, we apply the Hausman test for the applicability of random effects 
(RE) estimators.  
Finally, with OLS we assume a constant variance in the error term. In samples with very 
large  differences  in  country  pairs,  like  for  example  Germany-Slovenia  and  Austria-
Slovenia, we might meet with heteroscedasticity. Indeed, GLS specifications with cross-
section weights produce higher t-values compared to OLS, and we cannot assume con-
stant variances to be appropriate. Tables report GLS results.5  
4.2  Results 
Table 2 reports the results for vertical, total, and horizontal intra-industry trade ((a), (b), 
and (c)) according to the three model specifications (pooled, fixed and random effects). 
In all pooled regression (specifications 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1), the common constant is insig-
nificant. Distance is negatively correlated to the dependent variables as expected. The 
liberalization dummy is insignificant or only weakly significant.  
Vertical intra-industry trade: neither Neither REL-GDP nor REL-TECH explains verti-
cal intra-industry trade in pooled regressions (a.1.2). MIN- and MAXSIZE are signifi-
cant and have a positive sign: with lower similarity, vertical trade increases. Because 
country-pair specific effects might bias the result, we move to the FE model (a.1.2). We 
find fixed effects to be highly significant,6 and the F-test reveals a clear superiority of 
the FE model against the pooled model. Distance as a time-invariant determinant has to 
be deleted from the list of variables. Now, at least MAXSIZE is insignificant, while 
MINSIZE remains significant. REL-INDIS obtains the sign predicted by theory as well 
as the technology variable. Also, being a member of the EU tariffs union has a signifi-
cant impact on total intra-industry trade. However, we are not able to draw any conclu-
sion about the driving determinants for vertical intra-industry trade on the production 
side, for also REL-GDPC has a positive sign. The explanatory power (R
2) improves sig- 
                                                 
5   OLS results may be obtained from the author on request. 
6   Results may be obtained from author on request.  
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Table 2: 
Results of GLS estimations (420 observations) 
(a) Dependent variable: vertical intra-industry trade 
  Pooled  Fixed effects  Random effects 
Sub-model  a.1.1  a.1.2  a.1.3 
C  0.032  ---  -0.258 
REL-GDPC  -0.006  0.046***  0.002 
REL-TECH  -0.000  0.006**  0.004 
REL-INDIS  -0.013***  0.006***  -0.001 
MINSIZE  0.054***  0.024***  0.044*** 
MAXSIZE  0.037***  0.000  0.040*** 
DISTANCE  -0.106***  ---  -0.107*** 
CUDUM  -0.008  0.033***  0.004 
R
2 (unw.)  0.470  0.850  0.463 
Likelihood Ratio
a  ---  21.85***  --- 
Hausman 
b  ---  ---  22.13*** 
(b) Dependent variable: total intra-industry trade 
Sub-model  b.1.1  b.1.2  b.1.3 
C  0.001  --  -0.160 
REL-GDPC  -0.021***  0.004  -0.023 
REL-TECH  -0.002  0.015***  0.005 
REL-INDIS  -0.013***  0.007***  -0.003 
MINSIZE  0.077***  0.023**  0.061*** 
MAXSIZE  0.061***  0.051**  0.067*** 
DISTANCE  -0.146***  ---  -0.165*** 
CUDUM  0.015  0.006***  0.039** 
R
2 (unw.)  0.479  0.872  0.476 
Likelihood Ratio
a  ---  16.47***  --- 
Hausman
 b  ---  ---  26.29*** 
(c) Dependent variable: horizontal intra-industry trade 
Sub-model  c.3.1  c.3.2  c.3.3 
C  0.008  --  --0.021 
REL-GDPC  -0.009***  -0.010**  -0.010** 
REL-TECH  -0.001**  0.003***  0.000 
REL-INDIS  0.003***  -0.001  -0.003 
MINSIZE  0.011***  -0.001  0.011*** 
MAXSIZE  0.011***  0.020***  0.012*** 
DISTANCE  -0.018***  ---  -0.022*** 
CUDUM  0.004*  0.014***  0.012** 
R
2 (unw.)  0.290  0.621  0.292 
Likelihood Ratio
a  ---  6.17***  --- 
Hausman
b  ---  ---  10.33 
a F test
 ;
 b Chi-square statistics
  . –* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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nificantly compared to pooled regressions, which means that intra-industry trade is not a 
pure  statistical  phenomenon  due  to  inappropriate  calculation.  With  random  effects 
(a.1.3) the cost and technology variables and income distribution become insignificant. 
However, the Hausman test shows that the RE model is not appropriate.  
Total  intra-industry  trade:  Pooled  estimation  (b.2.1)  yields  the  expected  sign  for 
MINSIZE  and  REL-GDPC  (explaining  inter-industry  trade),  but  MAXSIZE  has  the 
wrong sign. Again, the FE model (b.2.2) demonstrates superiority against pooled regres-
sions. The country-pair constants are highly significant. The GDP per capita variable 
turns out to be insignificant. Furthermore, REL-TECH and personal income distribution 
differences explain total intra-industry trade. On the other side, the RE model (b.2.3) 
yields the predicted results, since all REL-variables become insignificant and do not ex-
plain total intra-industry trade. To sum up the results of our first indirect test do not re-
ject the results of the vertical model.  
Horizontal intra-industry trade: In the pooled version (c.3.1) we find the signs of coeffi-
cients to the REL- variables as predicted. Turning to panel estimations, the pecking or-
der of specifications is now that the FE model (c.3.2) should not be used, since the in-
significant chi-square statistics reveals correlation of the error term with independent 
variables. However, the explanatory power of the RE model (c.3.3) is rather low. REL-
GDPC is negative in all estimations. Technology differences and differences in income 
inequality play no role in explaining horizontal intra-industry trade. In summary, typical 
vertical trade model variables cannot explain horizontal trade patterns.   
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5  Conclusions 
A first result is that vertical intra-industry trade between old and new EU countries is 
ruled by determinants, which do not explain total and horizontal intra-industry trade. 
This finding is not new, but again confirmed by another regional framework. A second 
result is that personal income distribution plays a role for trade patterns in the given 
framework of regional trade integration. This brings us to the conclusion that the distri-
butional effects of the various policies matter. When we assume that horizontal trade 
pattern base on advanced technologies and higher value added per worker, a government 
might influence the shift to more horizontal pattern by considering the distributional ef-
fects of its policies. In ACs, income distribution shifted towards more inequality in their 
early transition period, and might have contributed to the high vertical shares in trade. 
But later we observe a correction to more equality, which seems to have been a reason 
for falling vertical and increasing horizontal shares. Further research should compare the 
both regions of the enlarged Union individually in order to find out, whether income dis-
tribution schemes tend to converge or diverge, and whether this has an impact on trade 
patterns. 
The third finding is an ‘inconclusion’ about the driving force for production localiza-
tion: costs or technology. Estimations tend to produce a significant positive correlation 
between technology differences as well as GDP per capita differences and vertical trade 
in fixed effects specifications. Neither convincing support for relative factor endowment 
nor for differences in technology in explaining vertical trade in the differentiated good 
(in industry) was found. Therefore, there is no clear indication of a product-quality cycle 
in EU-ACs relations; upgrading and catching-up in terms of technology are both still 
possible scenarios. Obviously, this includes also statements on the contribution of for-
eign direct investment to structural change and growth in former transition countries. An 
interesting aspect might be that the increasing impulse from rising GDP per capita dif-
ferences is much stronger then the combined decreasing impulse from eroding technol-
ogy and inequality differences, which we observed in Figures 4 throughout 6. An issue 
for further research might be to check, whether these ‘inconclusive conclusions’ are due 
to some noise in the vertical intra-industry determinant. It cannot be excluded that at the 
4-digit level of trade, the variables might be contaminated with a good portion of inter-
industry  elements.  Finally,  the  unexpected  results  for  the  size  variables  (above  all, 
MAXSIZE) are an issue for further research.   
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Annex I: Grubel-Lloyd index 
In equation (2), Tjk is the intra-industry share in total trade between a pair of countries j 
(home) and k (foreign), and for a set of n industries with X being the exports of the home 
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The share of inter-industry trade in total trade is (1-Tjk). Although the prescription for 
calculation makes a sharp cut between inter and intra-industry trade, Tjk is necessarily 
contaminated with some noise, for the data are for industries and not single goods. And 
here, disaggregating is relevant. With low-digit disaggregation (2-digit, for example), 
the index includes some inter-industry trade (Celi and Smith, 1999). Therefore, a high-
digit level is preferable for calculating the index. But with more disaggregated data, the 
number of empty entries in statistical reporting increases. In order to mitigate the trade-
off problem7 we decided for the 4-digit level. We pay particular attention to R
2 of re-
gressions in order to become certain that the chosen level is not too much distorted by 
inappropriate  calculation.  Further,  intra-industry  trade  models  assume  balanced  total 
trade, and imbalances might distort the correct measurement of shares. However, the 
empirical literature has not confirmed the superiority of the trade-balance adjusted GL 
index, and we use the unadjusted index in regressions.8  
Intra-industry trade in a specific good is horizontal, when the prices of the exported and 
imported good variety are close to each other. Trade statistics aggregate similar goods to 
industries and similar industries to sectors, for which ‘prices’ exist only under very restric-
tive conditions (identical costs, for example). Unit values (in this study: trade value di-
vided by metric tons) are the usual proxy for identifying differences in price indexes, and 
relative  unit  values  (RUV)  relate the unit values of export to those in imports. Intra-
industry trade is vertical, when the relative unit values of exports and imports in the same 
industry are less than 0.85 and larger than 1.15: >RUV = UVX/UVM >1.15. Within this 
range, trade is assumed to be horizontally differentiated. When only the industries with an 
RUV outside of the defined range are considered, equation (2) produces the share of verti-
cal intra-industry trade. Those items with only a RUVi >1.15 yield the high-quality posi-
tion in EU’s trade, and those with lower than 0.85 yield the low-quality position.  
                                                 
7   For 1993, no data were available in 13 cases, which is 1.9% of the entire 693 observations. Gaps 
were filled by extrapolating mean values from the remaining two entries (2000 and 2004).  
8   We disregard also the Aquino-index, which corrects even for imbalances in the individual industries. 
See the critical review by Vona (1991) on calculating intra-industry indices.  
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Annex II: personal income distribution 












= -   (3) 
Fj,k(.)are the cumulative distribution functions f in countries j (‘EU’) and k (‘AC’) up to 
the household h with the dividing (or marginal) income level d, which is in the interval 
[ ] 1 ,... , ,... 0 , , , d k d j h h k hj = . Households with an income less than hd consume the low-quality 
variety of the differentiated product, and consumers with a higher income the high-
quality variety. Any change in the cumulative distribution functions is positively corre-
lated with vertical intra-industry trade. In this study, the variable for a single country-
pair is constructed according  
REL- INDISjk,t= ln )) ( 1 ( ) ( , , k j d k k j d j h F h F - - - - .  (4) 











= - ,   (5) 
where GDP
PPS is the GDP at purchasing power parities, and POP the population in both 
countries; we simply assume the dividing income class in the bilateral framework j-k to 
be around the average GDP per capita. GDP data for 1993, 2000 and 2004 are from Eu-
rostat Online Database (2005b). Income distribution data is in per cent according house-
hold  deciles,  and  taken  from  UNU/WIDER  on  World  Income  Inequality  Database 
(WIID2a, 2005)).  
In most cases, income is disposable income, and in some cases it is monetary income. 
We identified three observations for each country in this period, however, at different 
points of time. The latest reporting year is 2001, the earliest year 1987 (for Slovenia). In 
the case of t = 1, we linked data to intra-industry data of 1993, in the case of t = 2 to the 
year of 2000, and in the case of t = 3 to the year of 2004).  
In order to find a distribution around the dividing income class in terms of average GDP 
per capita, we assume an equal distribution of the population across deciles (which is 
not very realistic, but the only practical way the data source allows). The GDP per capita  






PPS . h (.) and POP(.) 
are the household shares in income and the population of each decile. Table 3 demon-
strates the calculation modus by hand of the Austrian example for the year “2004”:  
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Table 3: 
Calculation example (Austria 2004) for relative income distribution 
J  k 
Bilateral 
GDP
PPS per  
capita (hdj-k)  
in Euro 
Fj(hd,j-k) 
in per cent 
of total  
income 
Fk(hd,j-k)  
in per cent 
of total  
income 
) ( 100 ( ( , , k j d k k j d j h F h F - - - -  
 
Austria  Bulgaria  17584  10  42  32 
  Czech Republic  21185  17  36  19 
  Estonia  25496  34  29  6 
  Hungary  19951  17  25  8 
  Latvia  23795  25  28  3 
  Lithuania  22765  25  26  1 
  Poland  14008  4  40  36 
  Romania  12735  4  24  20 
  Slovakia  21413  17  21  4 
  Slovenia  25844  34  20  14 
Source: author’s calculations. 
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